This document describes the use of TLS to provide privacy for DNS. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates opportunities for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries in the network, such as discussed in [RFC7258]. In addition, this document specifies two usage profiles for DNS-over-TLS and provides advice on performance considerations to minimize overhead from using TCP and TLS with DNS.
Introduction
Today, nearly all DNS queries [RFC1034] , [RFC1035] are sent unencrypted, which makes them vulnerable to eavesdropping by an attacker that has access to the network channel, reducing the privacy of the querier. Recent news reports have elevated these concerns, and recent IETF work has specified privacy considerations for DNS [RFC7626] .
Prior work has addressed some aspects of DNS security, but until recently there has been little work on privacy between a DNS client and server. DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC), [RFC4033] provide _response integrity_ by defining mechanisms to cryptographically sign zones, allowing end-users (or their first-hop resolver) to verify replies are correct. By intention, DNSSEC does not protect request and response privacy. Traditionally, either privacy was not considered a requirement for DNS traffic, or it was assumed that network traffic was sufficiently private, however these perceptions are evolving due to recent events [RFC7258] .
Other work that has offered the potential to encrypt between DNS clients and servers includes DNSCurve [dempsky-dnscurve], DNSCrypt [dnscrypt-website] , ConfidentialDNS [I-D.confidentialdns] and IPSECA [I-D.ipseca] . In addition to the present draft, the DPRIVE working group has recently adopted a DNS-over-DTLS [draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls] proposal.
This document describes using DNS-over-TLS on a well-known port and also offers advice on performance considerations to minimize overheads from using TCP and TLS with DNS.
Initiation of DNS-over-TLS is very straightforward. By establishing a connection over a well-known port, clients and servers expect and agree to negotiate a TLS session to secure the channel. Deployment will be gradual. Not all servers will support DNS-over-TLS and the well-known port might be blocked by some firewalls. Clients will be expected to keep track of servers that support TLS and those that don't. Clients and servers will adhere to the TLS implementation recommendations and security considerations of [RFC7525] or its successor.
The protocol described here works for queries and responses between stub clients and recursive servers. It might work equally between recursive clients and authoritative servers, but this application of the protocol is out of scope for the DNS PRIVate Exchange (DPRIVE) Working Group per its current charter. levels of assurance of privacy: an opportunistic privacy profile and an out-of-band key-pinned privacy profile. It is expected that a future document based on [dgr-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles] will further describe additional privacy profiles for DNS over both TLS and DTLS.
An earlier version of this document described a technique for upgrading a DNS-over-TCP connection to a DNS-over-TLS session with, essentially, "STARTTLS for DNS". To simplify the protocol, this document now only uses a well-known port to specify TLS use, omitting the upgrade approach. The upgrade approach no longer appears in this document, which now focuses exclusively on the use of a well-known port for DNS-over-TLS.
Reserved Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] .
Establishing and Managing DNS-over-TLS Sessions

Session Initiation
A DNS server that supports DNS-over-TLS MUST listen for and accept TCP connections on port 853. By mutual agreement with its clients, the server MAY, instead, use a port other than 853 for DNS-over-TLS.
DNS clients desiring privacy from DNS-over-TLS from a particular server MUST establish a TCP connection to port 853 on the server. By mutual agreement with its server, the client MAY, instead, use a port other than port 853 for DNS-over-TLS. Such an other port MUST NOT be port 53, but MAY be from the "first-come, first-served" port range. The first data exchange on this TCP connection MUST be the client and server initiating a TLS handshake using the procedure described in [RFC5246] . 
DNS clients and servers MUST
TLS Handshake and Authentication
Once the DNS client succeeds in connecting via TCP on the well-known port for DNS-over-TLS, it proceeds with the TLS handshake [RFC5246] , following the best practices specified in [RFC7525] or its successor.
The client will then authenticate the server, if required. This document does not propose new ideas for authentication. Depending on the privacy profile in use Section 4, the DNS client may choose not to require authentication of the server, or it may make use of trusted a SPKI Fingerprint pinset.
After TLS negotiation completes, the connection will be encrypted and is now protected from eavesdropping. At this point, normal DNS queries SHOULD take place.
Transmitting and Receiving Messages
All messages (requests and responses) in the established TLS session MUST use the two-octet length field described in Section 4.2.2 of [RFC1035] . For reasons of efficiency, DNS clients and servers SHOULD pass the two-octet length field, and the message described by that length field, to the TCP layer at the same time (e.g., in a single "write" system call) to make it more likely that all the data will be transmitted in a single TCP segment ([I-D.ietf-dnsop-5966bis], Section 8).
In order to minimize latency, clients SHOULD pipeline multiple queries over a TLS session. When a DNS client sends multiple queries to a server, it should not wait for an outstanding reply before sending the next query ([I-D.ietf-dnsop-5966bis], Section 6.2.1.1).
Since pipelined responses can arrive out-of-order, clients MUST match responses to outstanding queries using the ID field, query name, type, and class. For DNS clients that use library functions such as "getaddrinfo()" and "gethostbyname()", current implementations are known to open and close TCP connections each DNS call. To avoid excess TCP connections, each with a single query, clients SHOULD reuse a single TCP connection to the recursive resolver. Alternatively they may prefer to use UDP to a DNS-over-TLS enabled caching resolver on the same machine that then uses a system-wide TCP connection to the recursive resolver.
In order to amortize TCP and TLS connection setup costs, clients and servers SHOULD NOT immediately close a connection after each response. Instead, clients and servers SHOULD reuse existing connections for subsequent queries as long as they have sufficient resources. In some cases, this means that clients and servers may need to keep idle connections open for some amount of time.
Proper management of established and idle connections is important to the healthy operation of a DNS server. An implementor of DNS-over-TLS SHOULD follow best practices for DNS-over-TCP, as described in [I-D.ietf-dnsop-5966bis]. Failure to do so may lead to resource exhaustion and denial-of-service.
Whereas client and server implementations from the [RFC1035] 
Usage Profiles
This protocol provides flexibility to accommodate several different use cases. This document defines two usage profiles: (1) opportunistic privacy, and (2) out-of-band key-pinned authentication that can be used to obtain stronger privacy guarantees if the client has a trusted relationship with a DNS server supporting TLS. Additional methods of authentication will be defined in a forthcoming draft [dgr-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles].
Opportunistic Privacy Profile
For opportunistic privacy, analogous to SMTP opportunistic encryption [RFC7435] one does not require privacy, but one desires privacy when possible.
With opportunistic privacy, a client might learn of a TLS-enabled recursive DNS resolver from an untrusted source (such as DHCP while roaming), it might or might not validate the resolver. These choices maximize availability and performance, but they leave the client vulnerable to on-path attacks that remove privacy.
Opportunistic privacy can be used by any current client, but it only provides guaranteed privacy when there are no on-path active attackers.
Out-of-band Key-pinned Privacy Profile
The out-of-band key-pinned privacy profile can be used in environments where an established trust relationship already exists between DNS clients and servers (e.g., stub-to-recursive in enterprise networks, actively-maintained contractual service relationships, or a client using a public DNS resolver of this profile is that the client has strong guarantees about the privacy of its DNS data by connecting only to servers it can authenticate.
In this profile, clients authenticate servers by matching a set of Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) Fingerprints in an analogous manner to that described in [RFC7469] . With this out-of-band key-pinned privacy profile, client administrators SHOULD deploy a backup pin along with the primary pin, for the reasons explained in [RFC7469] . A backup pin is especially helpful in the event of a key rollover, so that a server operator does not have to coordinate key transitions with all its clients simultaneously. After a change of keys on the server, an updated pinset SHOULD be distributed to all clients in some secure way in preparation for future key rollover. The mechanism for out-of-band pinset update is out of scope for this document.
Such a client will only use DNS servers for which an SPKI Fingerprint pinset has been provided. The possession of trusted pre-deployed pinset allows the client to detect and prevent person-in-the-middle and downgrade attacks.
However, a configured DNS server may be temporarily unavailable when configuring a network. For example, for clients on networks that require authentication through web-based login, such authentication may rely on DNS interception and spoofing. Techniques such as those used by DNSSEC-trigger [dnssec-trigger] MAY be used during network configuration, with the intent to transition to the designated DNS provider after authentication. The user MUST be alerted that the DNS is not private during such bootstrap.
Upon successful TLS connection and handshake, the client computes the SPKI Fingerprints for the public keys found in the validated server's certificate chain (or in the raw public key, if the server provides that instead). If a computed fingerprint exactly matches one of the configured pins the client continues with the connection as normal. Otherwise, the client MUST treat the SPKI validation failure as a non-recoverable error. Appendix A provides a detailed example of how this authentication could be performed in practice.
Performance Considerations
DNS-over-TLS incurs additional latency at session startup. It also requires additional state (memory) and increased processing (CPU). [RFC7413] can eliminate that RTT when information exists from prior connections. The TLS handshake adds another two RTTs of latency. Clients and servers should support connection keepalive (reuse) and out-of-order processing to amortize connection setup costs. Fast TLS connection resumption [RFC5077] further reduces the setup delay and avoids the DNS server keeping per-client session state. TLS False Start [draft-ietf-tls-falsestart] can also lead to a latency reduction in certain situations.
2. State: The use of connection-oriented TCP requires keeping additional state at the server in both the kernel and application. The state requirements are of particular concern on servers with many clients, although memory-optimized TLS can add only modest state over TCP. Smaller timeout values will reduce the number of concurrent connections, and servers can preemptively close connections when resource limits are exceeded. A full performance evaluation is outside the scope of this specification. A more detailed analysis of the performance implications of DNS-over-TLS (and DNS-over-TCP) is discussed in [tdns] and [I-D.ietf-dnsop-5966bis].
IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to add the following value to the "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" registry in the System Range. The registry for that range requires IETF Review or IESG Approval [RFC6335] and such a review was requested using the Early Allocation process [RFC7120] for the well-known TCP port in this document.
We The TEMPORARY assignment expires 2016-10-08. IANA is requested to make the assigmnent permanent upon publication of this document as an RFC.
Design Evolution
[Note to RFC Editor: please do not remove this section prior to publication as it may be useful to future Foo-over-TLS efforts]
Earlier versions of this document proposed an upgrade-based approach to establishing a TLS session. The client would signal its interest in TLS by setting a "TLS OK" bit in the EDNS0 flags field. A server would signal its acceptance by responding with the TLS OK bit set.
Since we assume the client doesn't want to reveal (leak) any information prior to securing the channel, we proposed the use of a "dummy query" that clients could send for this purpose. The proposed query name was STARTTLS, query type TXT, and query class CH.
The TLS OK signaling approach has both advantages and disadvantages. One important advantage is that clients and servers could negotiate TLS. If the server is too busy, or doesn't want to provide TLS service to a particular client, it can respond negatively to the TLS probe. An ancillary benefit is that servers could collect information on adoption of DNS-over-TLS (via the TLS OK bit in queries) before implementation and deployment. Another anticipated advantage is the expectation that DNS-over-TLS would work over port 53. That is, no need to "waste" another port and deploy new firewall rules on middleboxes.
However, at the same time, there was uncertainty whether or not middleboxes would pass the TLS OK bit, given that the EDNS0 flags field has been unchanged for many years. Another disadvantage is that the TLS OK bit may make downgrade attacks easy and indistinguishable from broken middleboxes. From a performance standpoint, the upgrade-based approach had the disadvantage of requiring 1xRTT additional latency for the dummy query. This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 6982. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.
According to RFC 6982, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit". This section presents an example of how the out-of-band key-pinned privacy profile could work in practice based on a minimal pinset (two pins). Operators of a DNS-over-TLS service in this profile are expected to provide pins that are specific to the service being pinned (i.e., public keys belonging directly to the end-entity or to a service-specific private CA) and not to public key(s) of a generic public CA. A DNS client system is configured with an out-of-band key-pinned privacy profile from a network service, using a pinset containing two pins. Represented in HPKP [RFC7469] style, the pins are: o pin-sha256="FHkyLhvI0n70E47cJlRTamTrnYVcsYdjUGbr79CfAVI=" o pin-sha256="dFSY3wdPU8L0u/8qECuz5wtlSgnorYV2f66L6GNQg6w=" The client now takes the SHA-256 digest of the SPKI in cert A, and compares it against both pins in the pinset. If either pin matches, the verification is successful; the client continues with the TLS connection and can make its first DNS query.
If neither pin matches the SPKI of cert A, the client verifies that cert A is actually issued by cert B. If it is, it takes the SHA-256 digest of the SPKI in cert B and compares it against both pins in the pinset. If either pin matches, the verification is successful. Otherwise, it verifes that B was issued by C, and then compares the pins against the digest of C's SPKI.
If none of the SPKIs in the cryptographically-valid chain of certs match any pin in the pinset, the client closes the connection with an error, and marks the IP address as failed. 
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